I. THE STATUTORY AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. The Statute
The drafters of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934 would have had no difficulty with the proposition that these statutes governed an area of law-the sale and trading of securities-very different from the law of the governance of corporations. First, and most important, the problem they were addressing was a problem in the functioning and operation of the nation's securities markets. The 1929 stock market crash was thought to have been partially caused by excessive promotion of securities at prices unreasonably high in relation to the true underlying values. The effort was intended to introduce into securities promotion a more conservative bias in valuation, to require more emphasis on the bad news, to remove from the market structure certain speculative opportunities that created incentives for market manipulation, and to strengthen the mechanisms of market surveillance and regulation. Second, the drafters of the Acts were consciously drawing from the antecedents of state securities and exchange regulation, not the distinct body of state corporate law, carrying these models forward to the national level. 3 The statement of purpose for the 1934 Act states: " [T] ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto. '4 There was no mention of corporate law-the concern was with the securities markets and their function as institutions separate from the corporations themselves.
2 See J. Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 1-3 (1982). 3 For a descriptive study of state regulation of securities, see J. Edelman, Securities Regulation in the 48 States (1942) . Shortly after Congress passed the securities acts, the degree of state regulation was summarized:
The fact that statutues regulating the sale of securities exist in forty-seven of the forty-eight states, and that some of them have been in existence for as long as a quarter of a century, testifies that the present lively interest in the regulation of securities sales is not an overnight development. Although the various state statutes differ significantly both as to underlying theory and the degree of their effectiveness, it is undoubtedly true that they were chiefly inspired by a common purpose of protecting the investor from the unscrupulous corporate promoter. Furthermore, the securities that the 1933 and 1934 Acts regulated included many securities other than corporate common stock, such as bonds, notes, and warrants, and securities of issuers other than for profit stock corporations, such as securities of foreign governments, not for profit corporations, and cooperatives. 5 The fact that the statutes were meant to nationalize (although not exclusively-the state securities commissions were to survive 6 ) an area of law concerned with transactions in securities and not the law of corporations did not mean that problems of the intersection of these two spheres of concern would not arise. Provisions of the 1934 Act, like section 16,7 relating to short-swing profits by insiders, and section 14,8 relating to proxy solicitation, were not without implications for basic issues of corporate law. Laws that made it more difficult for promoters or managements to sell securities necessarily had an impact on the allocation of power within the corporation. Although the purpose of the 1934 Act was to improve the operation of the securities markets by regulating manipulative practices and improving the quality of information available to the market, one could anticipate that regulation of the use and disclosure of information would shift allocations of power within the corporate structure. This indirect effect would have been the whole story of the interaction between the federal securities laws and state corporate law were it not for the mysterious and ubiquitous rule 10b-5. ' If one approaches rule 10b-5 from its context within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, one finds that it is a rule implementing section 10(b) 1° of the Act. Section 10(b) is itself a "pickup" sec-tion, 11 designed to give the Securities Exchange Commission the power to fill the inevitable omissions in the listing of manipulative devices in section 9.12 In section 9, Congress spelled out in great detail the type of manipulative devices that it found had disrupted efficient pricing on the nation's securities exchanges, including practices such as wash sales and rigging of the market price. Congress well understood, however, that it might have failed to enumerate all of the practices with similarly harmful effects, and that it might be necessary to reach related off-exchange practices. Thus, section 10(b) provided that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person ... [t] o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. . . ."I Thus, Congress designed 10(b) to give to the Commission, as the expert body responsible for the regulation of trading in securities, the authority to define those specific practices that it considered "manipulative or deceptive." Upon promulgation of the regulation, the manipulative or deceptive practices that the Commission described would become illegal. Thus 10(b) contemplates regulations in the style of rules 10b-6'14 and lOb-7, 15 which define with clarity and specificity those practices that the Commission deems manipulative or deceptive.
Up to this point, the story is very simple, and has almost nothing to do with corporate law per se. The Commission's promulgation of rule 10b-5 in 1942,10 however, did unanticipated violence to the statutory scheme. Rule 10b-5 did not describe any particular practice that it deemed manipulative or deceptive, as the statutory The courts immediately passed up, without discussion, the two possibilities of finding rule 10b-5 void. First, the courts could have found it impermissibly vague. Second, they could have found it void as an abdication of the Commission's responsibility to use its rule making power to define the illegal practice in concrete terms so that persons that the statute affected might know what was prohibited. The courts, however, were comfortable with the task of defining the parameters of fraud. It was an enterprise that was to prove somewhat more daunting than was anticipated. For instance, only in light of the complications of defining the limits of "insider trading" that have surfaced in recent cases like Dirks v. SEC 8 does one clearly see the value that could have been gained by forcing the SEC to promulgate a precise substantive definition of illegal manipulative practices. The fact that the agency finds it more comfortable to avoid the discipline of defining the offense before bringing the charge 9 is no reason for eschewing the increased fairness and deterrent efficacy that would flow from the exercise.
In light of this background, it is sensible to construe the general prohibition of rule 10b-5 in a way that effectuates the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act, to provide a legal regime governing transactions in securities markets, while preserving state autonomy in the area of law left to the states, i.e., corporate law. Surely the federal courts should not use a backup, gap-filling section like 10(b) to displace partially and erratically the state law of corporations. Thus, when the Supreme Court turned to the problem of giving meaning to rule 10b-5, its attention to federalism and the coherent limits of national authority within this federal scheme was no mystery. The second important insight that an examination of the statute and its history offers is that Congress clearly drafted section 10 to avoid the implication of private rights of action. The issues of enforcement-by whom, how,, and for what-were carefully addressed in the 1934 Act. Indeed the 1934 Act is unusual in the detailed complexity of the enforcement scheme it provides. Authority was divided between the Securities Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Board, which was to enforce the margin requirements of section 7.20 Authority was also divided between the SEC and the exchanges, which continued to enjoy substantial regulatory authority subject to SEC oversight. 21 Some sections were to be enforceable by a private civil action, clearly defined. Thus, sections 9 (manipulative practices), 2 2 16 (insider trading for short-swing profits), 2 3 and 18 (liability for misleading statements) 24 contained provisions for private rights of action. The other sections were to be enforced by the expert Commission itself, which had many avenues open to it. For example, it had the licensing jurisdiction over exchanges and broker-dealers, 25 as well as the investigatory and injunction-seeking powers of section 21.28 
A Federal Vision
Section 10 was a section that contained no provision for a private right of action. Morever, given the overall structure of the statute, it was inconceivable that the omission was inadvertent. Thus, in deciding whether section 10 created a private right of action, the federal courts were not confronted with the problem of construing an ambiguous statute. The statute clearly provided for no such remedy.
B. The Historical Background
Nevertheless, the federal courts did imply a remedy under section 10. Two factors explain this result. First, the cases indicate ignorance of, or at least indifference to, the provisions of the substantive law discussed above. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 2 " illustrates well the judicial approach to the implication of private rights. Second, an awareness of the jurisprudential context suggests that the expansive interpretations of jusrisdiction may be partly explained as a reaction to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." 9 Kardon, which originally established the private right of action under rule 10b-5, was a fluke, a lucky stab in the dark by a plaintiff's lawyer groping for a device to reach a necessary party through the provision of section 27, providing for nationwide jurisdiction. There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that either the court or counsel had read the other provisions of the 1934 Act. 3 0 It was enough to know that rule 10b-5 made fraud illegal as a matter of federal law, that for every illegal act there should be remedy, and that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Act. Once decided, the decision drew more plaintiffs to 18 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) . See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 29 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . 30 The complete discussion of the plaintiff's right to a remedy is as follows:
[T]his action is grounded upon a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Act does no more than forbid certain types of conduct, which it defines in general terms, in connection with the purchase of securities. It does not even provide in express terms for a remedy, although the existence of a remedy is implicit under general principles of the law. Perhaps all that would be necessary for this decision would be the determination that the conduct of the defendants came within the terms of the Act and the remedy sought is one provided by the law for redress. However, the broad terms of the Act are to be made effective in a case like the present one through application of well known and well established equitable principles governing fiduciary relationships. Kardon, 73 F. Supp. at 802-03.
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the federal courts. It drew plaintiffs (and defendants), however, who were represented not by securities lawyers, but by corporate lawyers. These attorneys knew corporate law but not securities law, and to judge by the resulting line of decisions, they never found it necessary to read any part of the securities acts other than rule 10b-5.s' That is a style that has been dominant and is reflected in the standard coverage of the corporations course, a course that fits sections 10, 14, and 16 of the 1934 Act within a framework of the traditional issues of corporate law. 3 2 For such lawyers and judges, section 10 was simply a jurisdictional statute, conferring upon the federal courts jurisdiction to hear corporate cases and to draw upon general principles to promulgate "good" corporate law in a common law fashion. The high point of this development was J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 33 which found an implied cause of action under section 14 of the 1934 Act.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is also important for understanding this development. Prior to Erie, the federal courts sitting in diversity cases were able to draw upon Swift v. Tyson" to participate in, if not be the principal shapers of, corporate law. Erie seemed, for a time, to have left them with no job other than the mechanical application of controlling state decisions to many matters of general legal importance. They quickly found a new route to power, the implication of federal rights and remedies, and the law of rule 10b-5 is an important part of the story. The development was even celebrated by Judge Friendly in his "In Praise of Erie" speech, delivered just as this period of implying rights was about to end.
5
It ended for two reasons. First, simple-minded pursuit of the implied rights and remedies approach began to run head-on into 31 Apparently, the Supreme Court also did not find it necessary to refer to the statute to A Federal Vision problems of practical administration and good sense, and the courts were forced to return to the statute itself to find a limit to their authority. If, for instance, a remedy should be implied under section 10 of the 1934 Act, then why not under all the other sections? Such an expansion would require, for example, a remedy under section 7, the margin section, so that a customer who had been given an illegal amount of margin, enabling him to take overly speculative positions, would have a right to sue for any losses. After all, the threat of such an action would make the brokerage houses more careful in their administration of margin accounts. The problem was that such a cause of action seemed to benefit the speculator whose options section 7 attempted to constrain. These claims could not be considered without reading the statute, and once the courts began to read the statute they discovered that the problem was much more difficult than they had assumed.
Second, on a larger perspective, the federal courts recovered from the sense that Erie had left them without important work to do. The 1960's and 1970's were years of rapid federal statutory development, each statute containing elaborate and extensive provision for construction and enforcement by the federal judiciary. In an era when all who work, emit, or govern must pass the scrutiny of a federal district judge, there is little need to engage in awkward statutory construction to find new business. Indeed, when the opinions of the courts of appeals read more like hastily scribbled notes from a harried senior partner than thoughtful essays on the requirements of justice, it seems a bit foolish for the courts to seek more business."
The Supreme Court's comments in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 414 (1982), show an awareness of the impact of the degree of federal legislation on the implication of private rights of action. First, the Court described its approach in the former days of limited federal legislation: Our approach to the task of determining whether Congress intended to authorize a private cause of action has changed significantly, much as the quality and quantity of federal legislation has undergone significant change. When federal statutes were less comprehensive, the Court applied a relatively simple test to determine the availability of an implied private remedy. If a statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary normally recognized a remedy for members of that class. Id. at 374. The Court then acknowledged how the approach had necessarily changed as federal statutes became more expansive:
In 1975 the Court unanimously decided to modify its approach to the question whether a federal statute includes a private right of action. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
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The Supreme Court, at least, clearly was influenced by both of these developments, and came to understand that Borak was an indefensible construction of the statute, and Kardon an organic growth that had gone too far to be excised. The Court simply grandfathered in the prior law, and made it clear that for the future the expansion by implication was over. This approach did have the awkward effect of "simply freezing the status quo as of a certain point in time, ' 3 7 but reflected the awkwardness of simultaneously honoring the statutory scheme and the reasonable expectations built upon the Court's own prior decisions. When courts legislate they are inevitably led, like legislatures, to draw arbitrary lines.
These two factors, the strain between the statutory structure and a principle of free implication, and the changed perception of the business needs of the federal courts, explain the decisions that the principal paper discusses and the federalism theme they invoke. The federal courts, no longer feeling the need for more business, will leave to the states the development of corporate law because that is where Congress, when it passed the securities laws, left it.
II. THE CASES
The next question to be examined is whether the principal cases are consistent with the approach this discussion suggests. The argument of the principal paper proceeds abstractly, and does not specifically discuss which of the principal cases is wrongly decided in a pro-management direction because of a misplaced emphasis on federalism. Even a brief sketch of the cases relied upon in the principal paper indicates that they are explained and justified when viewed in light of the context discussed above.
(1975)
, the Court confronted a claim that a private litigant could recover damages for violation of a criminal statute that had never before been thought to include a private remedy. In rejecting that claim the Court outlined criteria that primarily focused on the intent of Congress in enacting the statute under review. The increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirabilty of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent than [the former view] had required. Id. at 377 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
37 Anderson, supra note 1, at 848.
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A. Cases in Which No Cause of Action Is Found
The Supreme Court began to cut back on the implication of private remedies in Cort v. Ash." This case involved a stockholder's derivative claim against corporate management for making expenditures in violation of a federal criminal statute that prohibited political contributions by corporations and labor unions in federal elections. 9 The plaintiff dropped a state pendant count from the complaint after being asked to post security for expenses under state law, and in the Supreme Court relied only on the argument that a corporate derivative cause of action should be implied from the criminal statute. 40 The unanimous Court simply said the statute did not provide for the remedy, the statute was concerned with federal elections, not corporate law, and state law defined the rights of shareholders against management. 1 If, as the plaintiff in Cort and the author of the principal paper intimate, the Court were to imply a federal, corporate derivative action from every federal prohibition with implications for corporate behavior, the effect on corporate law would have been enormous. The prohibitions contained in antitrust, pollution, and tax laws, to name a few, would all be enforceable by private action in federal courts under such logic. Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court declined to imply a private cause of action here. Its emphasis on federalism was appropriate for reasons having nothing to do with a pro-management bias.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 2 the Supreme Court decided that a defeated tender-offeror had no cause of action under section 14(e), which section 3(e) of the Williams Act" 3 added to the 1934 Act. That was a reasonable construction of the Act,' 4 and a decision that, by freeing tender-offerors from one source of litigation, was potentially both anti-incumbent management and pro-shareholder. The Court properly recognized that a damage award to a defeated tender-offeror would not effectively protect the interests of the shareholders whom the Act was designed to protect. 45 Furthermore, shareholders remain free to bring their own actions.
Santa Fe Industries v. Green involved the question of whether a shareholder unhappy with a Delaware short-form merger had stated a cause of action under rule 10b-5. Rules about the procedures and remedies for mergers are issues of corporate law, not securities law. The states have addressed these issues at length and in varying ways. 41 Would it make good "administrative" sense to have simultaneously both state and federal law on this topic? In light of the nature and context of rule 10b-5, the Court properly refused to employ the rule to allow private actions to intrude into this area of corporate mergers, an area quite distinct from the securities concerns that led to the Acts. 48 Finally, in Burks v. Lasker 8 the issue was whether state law or federal law controlled the procedure by which a corporation's board of directors could assume control of a shareholder's derivative suit. The Supreme Court held that state law was to determine the appropriate procedure for a derivative suit involving a registered investment company, unless the state law was inconsistent with some provision of the federal law. 50 The Court expressly relied upon the fact that Congress had not displaced state regulation of corporations by regulating securities.
5 1 The states, not the federal government, granted corporate authority, and the federal statute merely placed controls and restrictions on that authority. The Court, apparently cognizant of the dangers and difficulties with illegitimate exercise of federal court power, properly refused to imply a control where Congress had not placed one.
In all of these cases, the Court seems to have reached the following conclusions: (1) the issue presented was not germane to the federal statutory scheme regulating securities and securities mar- kets; (2) state law traditionally addressed and answered the issue; (3) Congress had no intent to displace the state law; and (4) the Court had better things to do than construct a new federal law by implication.
B. Cases in Which the Court Implied a Remedy
Two recent cases in which the Court found a paramount national interest illustrate by contrast the correctness of the preceding decisions.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 52 plaintiffs, participants in commodity futures trading, alleged that defendants caused losses to the plaintiffs by conduct in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act. The causes of action related to the operation of the market itself, the object of the statutory regulation, 53 and the Supreme Court found an implied remedy. This result is consistent with the proposition that the Court, in light of the concerns that prompted Congress to enact the regulatory scheme, is limiting the implication of private rights of action to those areas specifically concerned with the operation of securities and securities markets, rather than using the limited grant of authority to carve out an expansive role for itself in internal corporate affairs.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. 54 the Supreme Court found state regulation of tender offers constitutionally preempted. Although the constitutional basis of the decision is problematic, the state regulation related to offers being made in the national securities market. 5 5 Problems of the external effects of state regulation were strong because requirements in any one state would as a practical matter affect whether a tender offer would be made in any state. 58 The Williams Act regulated such offers, and the influence of multiple state regulations would upset the balance established by Con--456 U.S. 353 (1982) .
5S
The Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § § 1-26 (1982) was described by the Court as "'a comprehensive ... complex' regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex." 456 U.S. at 356 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) 
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HeinOnline --70 Va. L. Rev. 869 1984 gress in this Act. 57 The matter related to national transactions in securities. The Court, taking its cue from Congress' regulation of such transactions, found such offers appropriate for national rather than local regulation because the burdens on interstate commerce would be greater than the putative local interests used to justify regulation.
III. THE THREE CRITICAL PROPOSITIONS
A. The Law Would Normally Imply a Remedy
The principal paper asserts that the Supreme Court's failure to imply a remedy is anomolous: "The extreme deference that the Court has shown congressional intent with respect to implied rights of action seems inconsistent with the Court's independence in defining its own role in implementing federal legislation." ' , As discussed above, an interpretation of the 1934 Act that limits the remedies to those that Congress explicitly provided is hardly "extreme." It is only extreme in relation to decisions such as Borak. Yet why should law be a one-way rachet, making it "extreme" not to follow the implications of mistakes once they are made, but not "extreme" to make the mistakes in the first place? The Court's refusals to imply a remedy are not at all inappropriate in light of the historical context discussed above. It is only when one ignores the need for fidelity to the congressional scheme of regulation and substitutes one's own policy preferences that these refusals can be considered extreme. If the lack of a private remedy is indeed extreme, the criticism properly should be directed at Congress, not the courts.
B. The State Has No Interests
"The 'interest' of a state is the interest of those of its citizens who have succeeded in ,having their own policy and outcome preferences expressed through state law." e 59 This popularized applica-57 Id. at 634-40. " Anderson, supra note 1, at 833. 59 Id. at 839; see also id. at 846 ("State 'interests' are simply the interests of those who are likely to achieve the desired outcome if state law rather than federal law applies."); id. at 847 ("[T]o define a 'state interest' is merely to recognize an underlying preferred interest."). The author's objection to the appeal to state interests is that it masks a pro-management policy choice. As will be seen, infra, even if one is prepared to assume that a state has no [Vol. 70:857 HeinOnline --70 Va. L. Rev. 870 1984 tion of modern political science leaves no room for the possibility that states have an interest in the "right rule." Using the typical Delaware example, the paper argues that Delaware has no interest in many of its corporations because their managements, employees, and stockholders have no connection with the state except as a place of incorporation.°T he present system of state corporate law has evolved out of a conscious system of cooperation among the states. As the principal paper notes, traditional doctrines would permit states to override Delaware's role in corporate law by imposing rules based upon the connection of their citizens with the corporation. 6 ' They have not done so, however, because they have concluded either that the present system works well or that it works to the advantage of their citizens. A corporation is permitted under the laws of every state to choose Delaware law to govern its internal affairs by its choice of state of incorporation, just as parties to commercial contracts are permitted though a choice-of-law clause to choose the controlling commercial law. Thus, Delaware's role emerges not just from the assertion of power by Delaware, but from the fact that the other states have supported and facilitated that role. Their interests are at stake too.
A state can have an interest in good law. Good law may make the corporations work better for the benefit of the state and its citizens. If the states have concluded that the present arrangements are satisfactory and have not used their powers to change them, and if Congress has not acted under the commerce power to displace state corporate law, then what special competence or license does the Court have to decide to overhaul the present system? And if the Court has none, then why should it construe the securities acts in a way designed to displace state law? Once again, the argument presented for the Court's interference simply fails to address adequately these questions of institutional legitimacy and competence.
interests, the suggestion that a pro-management regime necessarily results from a deference to state law is specious.
60 Id. at 840.
C. Failure To Create a Federal Cause of Action Is Pro-management
Having concluded that a state has no interests as such, the paper argues that state law is in fact pro-management, and therefore that failure to find a federal cause of action simply sustains this antishareholder bias: "There seems to be no disagreement that state regulation means more managerial autonomy because of competition among the states." 2 This, of course, depends on whether the states permit managements to "escape" their regulation. For instance, the paper cites state takeover legislation as suggesting "that the mechanism by which states compete in the corporate law area is by responding to the interests of managers, not shareholders, and that managerial interests are not always synonymous with shareholder interests. 63 Takeover regulation, however, is a bad example, for such regulation has based jurisdiction on more than the state of incorporation, and managements have not been free, simply by their choice of the state of incorporation,'to determine the applicable regulation. How such "pure" competition might have operated cannot now be known.
Even if one assumes that the substantive rules of state law favor management over shareholders, it is far from clear that these rules are all that matter. Frequently, corporate litigation turns as much on the factfinding process as the applicable rules. One effect of an implied cause of action is to improve the chances of federal jurisdiction, which in turn improves the chances of extensive discovery and superior factfinding processes. Given a choice between the federal or the state judiciaries, many corporate managements would choose the federal. Thus, the failure to imply a cause in the federal courts may not be in management's best interests. In many cases, corporate defense lawyers were probably willing facilitators of the expansion of federal jurisdiction.
The thesis of the new literature of competitive law-making in corporate law is that states compete to favor the firm, not the management, and that a move to a state like Delaware helps shareholders. 6 4 Indeed, the only published empirical study shows that a 02 Id. at 846-47. 63 Id. at 847. move to Delaware increases the value of the shareholders' shares.
65
If that is the nature of the competition, then when federal law displaces state law, shareholders are not helped.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a simple matter of sensible allocation of power and coherent administration, it makes sense to limit national rules to areas such as the securities markets, which are the subject of comprehensive federal legislation, and leave to the states the development of the law governing internal relations within corporations. The fact that there will be line drawing problems at the borders between these two areas of competence does not mean that the enterprise of construing statutes in harmony with that basic scheme is either nonsense or a cover for decisions reached on other grounds.
65 Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980) (shows increase in share value prior to announcement of move to Delaware, which remains in the stock price after the move).
